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ABSTRACT
Digital divide has been a common concern during the past two or
three decades; traditionally, it refers to a gap between developed
and developing countries in the adoption and use of digital tech-
nologies. Given the importance of the topic, digital divide has been
also extensively studied, although, hitherto, there is no previous
research that would have linked the concept to online media. Given
this gap in the literature, this paper evaluates the “maturity” of
online media in 134 countries between 2007 and 2016. Maturity
is defined according to the levels of national online media con-
sumption, diversity of political perspectives presented in national
online media, and consensus in reporting major political events in
national online media. These aspects are explained by considering
explanatory factors related to economy, infrastructure, politics, and
administration. According to the empirical results based on a dy-
namic panel data methodology, variables representing each aspects
are also associated with the maturity of national online media.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Digital divide is a well-established umbrella concept traditionally
used to describe the gap that exists in the adoption, use, and matu-
rity of digital technologies—from personal computers to national
network infrastructures—between developed and developing coun-
tries. But while in the 1990s the concept was mainly used in terms
of access to digital infrastructures—among these the Internet, the
concept’s scope has widened step by step. Today, there are not
only a digital divide, or the digital divide, but digital divides [23];
between countries, between infrastructures, between education
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systems, between disabled and those without impairments [34],
between young and old, between genders, and so on and so forth.
The present paper takes a conventional cross-country viewpoint
to these digital divides. That said, the paper’s context and perspec-
tive are both unconventional and novel; the paper is the first to
examine a digital divide in terms of online media and its maturity
particularly in developing countries. Furthermore, according to a
decent literature search from all relevant databases, there is a very
limited literature base on media in developing countries. Against
this background, to motivate the context and perspective further, a
few words should be said more about digital divides and media.
On one hand, these digital divides cast a shadow on popular
explanations for the use digital technologies. For instance, the so-
called technology acceptance model (TAM) posits that people tend
to accept new digital technologies when these are easy to use and
benefit their daily work [9]. Although the model has been extended
with various other factors, it still tends to undermine socioeco-
nomic factors. When one does not know how to read, or when one
is suffering from hunger, ease of use or perceived usefulness of new
technologies are supposedly the last thing in one’s mind. A simi-
lar point applies to online media; even though audiovisual media
content is increasingly common, at least a degree literacy is still
required to appreciate media in general and journalism in particular.
On the other hand, there are certain shortcomings and historical
baggage in the digital divide(s) research as well. Although access
to the Internet and digital technologies in general continues to be a
grave problem in some developing countries, as it was already in
the 1990s, in some developing countries Internet access is already
on par with developed countries thanks to widespread use of mobile
phones [14, 23, 24]. Therefore, the infrastructure is already there
for online media at least in some developing countries. A more
fundamental point is also present; it is relevant to consider other
factors than technology when considering the digital divide(s).
The reasons for not being online are many. Some may not have
access, but others may not have money, skills, time, or even need;
and others may lack awareness or interests [39]. In other words,
digital divide is also a socioeconomic and cultural phenomenon [24].
Access to digital devices and the Internet do not guarantee con-
tinuous and productive use of digital technologies and services,
which, throughout the world, are increasingly important for cit-
izens to efficiently participate in society and politics [14]. Even
in Western countries literature skills, for instance, tend to some
extent prevent efficient participation and thus undermine citizens’
self-management and self-actualization [31]. As is soon discussed
in Section 2, media has an important function in this conundrum.
Although economic rationale is present, media as a system is
often seen to also involve societal and educational functions; to en-
lighten and empower citizens; to reduce prejudices [17]; to provide
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be discussed and mediated; and so on. When considering the emer-
gence of a mature online media system particularly in developing
countries, technological and economic factors cannot thus provide
a sufficient explanation alone. This point can be further used to
criticize the existing technology adoption and evolution models.
Besides the classical TAM model and its adaptations, there is a
large number of different maturity models for digital businesses.
However, many—if not most—of these models concentrated on orga-
nizational and firm-level economic factors, including transactions
and business processes [18, 20]. Although online media companies
are businesses like other companies, their operating environment
is distinctively different from typical e-business companies. While
property rights, intellectual rights, and contract law in general are
necessary for all businesses [40], media companies typically (but
not necessarily) need also civil rights to succeed; freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of speech, and media freedom are inherently tied to
media and journalism. A media company may succeed economi-
cally without these, but the success comes at the cost of sacrificing
almost universally held ideals about journalism. These points mo-
tivate a societal aspect discussed in the next Section 2. Then, the
empirical research design is elaborated in Section 3, results are
presented in Section 4, and conclusions follow in Section 5.
2 A FRAMEWORK
Digital increasingly intervenes with physical. Not only are new
technologies such as artificial intelligence and virtual realitymaking
the boundary blurry for human beings, but the boundary spanning
extend toward political economy, geopolitics, and even warfare [33].
Also media is entangled in this “mega trend” of digitalization. As
a format, traditional print media has long lost to radio, television,
and online media sources—including online-only outlets and social
media—in most Western countries particularly among the younger
generations [21]. Media continues to be in a state of rupture. But
traditional media has not stood idle. Most newspapers are available
online, new online-only outlets have emerged, and innovative plat-
forms have been developed to enhance journalism in the new digital
era. At the same time, large multinational companies are eating
media’s advertising revenues [30], misinformation, disinformation,
and propaganda are rampant online [29], and in many countries
local newspapers are struggling [35], media ownership continues to
concentrate [11], and public broadcasting media is under a political
pressure [10], to only name a few challenges. These are some of
the smaller trends behind the digitalization mega trend in Western
countries. Elsewhere, in developing countries, the situation may
be somewhat different. It is difficult to face digitalization of media
when there is a shortage of electricity—to give an extreme example.
How to theorize the maturity of online media particularly in de-
veloping countries? To keep things simple, a sensible starting point
is to distinguish a societal perspective from an economic perspective
to online media. To still simplify, infrastructure can be considered
alongside economy, and the societal viewpoint can be broken down
to administration and politics. The analytical result is illustrated in
Fig. 1. Needless to say, in reality, all of the analytical dimensions
intervene; there is no economy without an infrastructure, politics
















Figure 1: An Analytical Framework
The societal perspective is most of all a normative stance on
what media is and should be. This is the question that was asked by
Siebert and associates in their classical 1984 monograph Four Theo-
ries of the Press ([37]; for the background see also [4, 32]). Although
the book starts to show its age, it is still useful for understanding the
normative underpinnings. Accordingly, there are four normative
theories on the press, and the first is the communist one; a press
should ensure the stability of a society by educating and empow-
ering people, although, in practice, the press in past communist
countries turned out to be a machinery for propaganda. The second
model is an authoritarian press; a press controlled by authoritarian
rulers and ran by selected journalists. The third model is the polar
opposite; a press that is free from any governmental control akin
to the libertarian idea of the “marketplace of ideas.” Besides the
free exchange of ideas, the theory posits media as a watchdog for
the government and ruling elites. The fourth model follows the
libertarian ideals but takes also social responsibility into account
with aspects such as enlightenment, education, and meditation of
societal conflicts. Although none of the models have existed in
their pure form, the current Western media systems are located
somewhere between the libertarian and social responsibility mod-
els. As is typical to classification systems, the four models were
later altered and fine-tuned. For instance, the Western media sys-
tems have been further broken down to liberal tradition followed
in the English-speaking countries, a corporatist system typical to
the Nordic countries, and a polarized pluralist system typical to
Central Europe [12]. Nevertheless, all of these systems share same
universal ideals, among these the freedom of expression, the power
and duty to criticize rulers, and many other related ideals.
Against this backdrop, it becomes understandable why digital
divide is also a political concept; unstable governments, corruption,
lack of transparency and accountability, security and secrecy, and
related factors are a reality in many developing countries [38]. Such
conditions not only hamper journalism, whether offline or online,
but also undermine the more or less universal ideals about media.
These ideals are also taken to reflect the “maturity” of online
media. A mature online media should not be only about yellow, pa-
parazzi, or gonzo journalism—even though the digital environment
and its engagement dynamics tend to perhaps push journalism
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into this direction. As with the four theories, the normative stance
should be acknowledged; taking something like The Intercept as
an ideal type is not universally shared even among journalists in
the Western countries. That said, some of the ideals—such as the
function of a press as a watchdog of ruling elites—are shared also
by journalists in many developing countries, although “it is not
enough to sail in a turbulent sea with a small boat” [15, p. 31]. There
is also a more concrete reason behind this normative maturity no-
tion. Running a media needs money, and money from Western
countries—whether through investments, developing aid, or some-
thing else—tends to come with the same idealistic strings attached.
Some of these strings, such as the freedom of information (but not
necessarily expression), have been endorsed also by the United
Nations and related organizations since the 1970s onward [28]. Par-
ticularly during the heydays of the Cold War, mainstream Western
media was typically seen as an essential building block in the devel-
opment of a well-functioning civil society and thus democracy [19].
While the strings may have loosened, they are still there, partly
due to free trade and global regulatory pressure for national media
systems [27]. The strings lead to the economic perspective in turn.
On the supply side of economy, a robust infrastructure is required
for online media to emerge. While states may supply infrastructures
for online media and dictate its content in communist and authori-
tarian countries, economic incentives and entrepreneurial ambition
are required to establish new online media in other countries. In
this regard, limited capital, lack of skilled labor, and low tolerance
of financial risks have been a long-standing problem particularly
for small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries [2].
Yet infrastructure can be also understood broadly to cover not only
economic and technological aspects but also socioeconomic factors,
such as education and basic income above extreme poverty.
Indeed, existing studies indicate that income and education are
among the most important aspects distinguishing the use of digital
technologies in developed and developing countries [14]. These
aspects nurture the demand side. If people live in poverty, they
are unlikely to pay for online media. Conversely: when people
have money and are willing to spend it on online media, there is
also a demand for online content. On this demand side, there is
not necessarily a notable gap between developed and developing
countries—getting people to pay for online content is a problem
everywhere. This problem is further associated with the iron grip
of multinational technology companies who, too, have not stood
idle; in many developing countries, the Internet and Facebook are
synonyms [36]. Besides all other problems and obstacles, the Big
Tech entanglement does not at least make things easier for those
attempting to build online media outlets in developing countries.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Data
The dataset assembled covers 𝑛 = 134 countries and 𝑡 = 10 years,
spanning a period between 2007 and 2016. The assembling was done
with the goal of keeping the amount of missing values at minimum.
Although some countries and years had to be thus dropped, the
coverage across the world is good, as can be concluded from Fig. 2.
Two data sources were used: theWorld Bank’s online data portals
and the varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project. The latter source
Figure 2: Countries Covered in the Dataset
has been widely used in social sciences (see [16, 29], among oth-
ers), and for a good reason; currently, the V-Dem project provides
the most comprehensive comparative dataset on democracy, civil
liberties, digital society, and related phenomena. The data is suppos-
edly also robust, as exemplified the lack of missing values, which,
unfortunately, are a problem with the World Bank data even after
deleting many country-year pairs. Following recent research [32],
these missing values were interpolated with cubic splines [1].
3.2 Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables are used [5, pp. 325–326]. The first is the
consumption of online media by domestic audiences. In the V-Dem
dataset this variable is measuredwith a four-item Likert-scale: (0) no
one consumes domestic online media; (1) limited consumption of
domestic online media; (2) relatively common consumption of do-
mestic online media; and (3) almost everyone consumes domestic
online media. Like many variables in the dataset, it is converted
to an ordinal scale that resembles z-values; the value zero approx-
imates the mean of all country-year pairs of the variable in the
V-Dem dataset [7, pp. 24-25]. With this scaling, indeed, the vari-
able’s empirical distribution resembles the normal distribution even
after the necessary removal of countries, as can be concluded from
the topmost plot in Fig. 3. Negative values indicate infrequent con-
sumption of domestic online media, whereas large positive values
correspond with a well-consumed online domestic media. In the
sample used the most consumed domestic online media are located
in Sweden, South Korea, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Iceland.
The second dependent variable measures the diversity of political
perspectives expressed in online media. Again, a four-item Likert
scale is used (before scaling): (0) only a government’s perspectives
are represented; (1) also perspectives of semi-official, government-
approved opposition are represented; (3) there is at least one major
online outlet representing all perspectives important to a society;
(4) there are many outlets representing a wide array of perspectives.
When looking at the middle plot in Fig. 3, the interpretation is fairly
straightforward with respect to non-democratic countries.
The third and final dependent variable asks a question about
whether major domestic online outlets represents a major political
event similarly. Before scaling, this question is yet again answered
with a four-item Likert scale: major outlets (1) give opposing views;
(2) differ greatly in their reporting ofmajor political events; (3) some-
times agree; (4) mostly agree; and (5) there are only small differences
in reporting of big political events. Thus, the variable measures
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Jukka Ruohonen and Anne-Marie Tuikka






































































Figure 3: Presence of Online Media
political consensus of online media; the higher a value, the higher
the consensus. Alternatively: because major newspapers are state-
controlled in many authoritarian countries, reporting mainly in line
of political establishments, more divergence may be found from
online outlets. When looking at the countries with low and high
scaled scores in Fig. 3, either interpretation seems plausible.
The three variables are assumed to represent different viewpoints
on the maturity of an online media ecosystem in a given country.
When online media is well-established and widely consumed, it
represents also a plurality of different political viewpoints, and
so forth. Statistically, however, the variables are unrelated; the
maximum correlation coefficient between the three variables is only
0.33. This lack of forceful statistical dependence justifies modeling
of the three variables separately even though they are understood
to be parts of the same underlying online media maturity concept.
3.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables are enumerated in Table 1 within which
the third column refers to the online source from which a given
dataset was retrieved. That is to say, the primary source may differ
for some of the World Bank’s datasets. For instance, the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union is the primary data source for
the fixed broadband and mobile cellular subscription amounts. The
grouping of the variables aligns with the analytical framework in
Fig. 1; each group is represented by four carefully selected variables.
The economic and infrastructure variables have been widely
used in previous research [25, 26]. It is therefore more relevant to
make few remarks about the operationalization of the variables.
The variables from the World Bank’s TCdata360 portal [45], such as
those for corruption or government transparency, are scalar-valued
indices whose values range from one to seven; the higher a value,
the better the outcome; a value seven implies an unlikely case that
no corruption whatsoever is present in a country, for instance.
The political variables from the V-Dem project [5] require a
more thorough elaboration. The variable for liberal democracy is a
composite index, constructed from four individual variables. It mea-
sures the protection of minority groups and individuals against the
tyranny of the state and the majority; higher values indicate more
liberalism. The freedom of expression variable, too, is a composite
index measuring press freedom, academic and cultural expression,
as well as the freedom of people to discuss political issues at home
and in public spaces. Political arrest measures the likelihood that
a citizen will be arrested upon posting political content online.
A four-item Likert-scale is used: an arrest is (0) extremely likely, (1)
likely, (2) unlikely, or (3) extremely unlikely. The removal of online
content by a government, in turn, is measured with a five-item scale:
(0) any content can be removed at will; (1) law protects only politi-
cally uncontroversial issues; (2) legal ambiguity exists for removal;
(3) political speech is mostly protected yet politically controversial
content may be removed; (4) a law protects all political speech such
that a government can only remove content according to rigorous
legal criteria. By hypothesis, at least one of these political vari-
ables should be associated either with the perspectives dependent
variable or the fractionalization dependent variable, or both.
3.4 Methods
The dataset’s nature is time series cross-sectional data, but, since
𝑛 > 𝑡 to a fair margin, panel data is a better characterization. The
classical estimator for such data is ordinary least squares augmented
with dummy variables for the years and countries. In addition to
problems with accuracy [22], as manifested in the covariance struc-
ture and thus standard errors of the regression coefficients, the least
squares estimator ignores all longitudinal dynamics; autocorrela-
tion in the error term is thus another problem. Adding a lagged
dependent variable is an option, but it leads to additional problems.
To address these issues, the dynamic Arellano-Bond panel data
estimator [3] is used, as implemented in an R package [8]. Essen-
tially, the estimator uses a lagged dependent variable and first
differences to get rid of the constant (𝛼) and the cross-sectional
effects (𝑐𝑖 ), such that in a toy model with only one independent
variable, an equation 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 becomes
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝜖𝑖𝑡 . This, however, creates a moving
average process to the error term, which the estimator accounts
for with instrumental variables. For the models estimated, the sec-
ond, third, and fourth lags are used as instruments for the lagged
dependent variable as well as all independent variables. In addition,
lagged differences, Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡−1, are added for the independent variables.
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Table 1: Independent Variables (refer to Fig. 1 for the analytical motivation)
Variable Category Description Retrieval source
GDP Economy GDP per capita (current US$) [43]
FDI Economy Foreign direct investment inward flows (% GDP) [42]
Procurement Economy Government procurement of advanced technology products [45]
State economy Economy State control of important sectors of economy [6]
Electricity Infrastructure Electricity and telephony infrastructure [45]
Education Infrastructure Quality of the education system [45]
Broadband Infrastructure Fixed broadband subscriptions [41]
Mobile Infrastructure Mobile cellular subscriptions [44]
Rule of law Administration Enforcement and compliance with laws [6]
Accountability Administration Accountability of a government [6]
Transparency Administration Transparency of a government’s policy-making [45]
Corruption Administration Ethics and corruption [45]
Liberal democracy Politics Extent of liberal democracy [6]
Freedom of expression Politics Freedom of expression of media and people [6]
Political arrests Politics Arrests due to political online content [6]
Content removal Politics Government removal of online content [6]
As for basic diagnostic checks, first-order autocorrelation (AR)
should be present but second-order should be absent; a test devel-
oped by Arellano and Bond [3] is provided by the implementation
used. And as for practical estimation, a ln(𝑥 + 1) is transformation
is applied to all independent variables that do not attain negative
values. Finally, nine additional dummy variables are included for
annual effects, although these are not reported for brevity.
4 RESULTS
The regression results are summarized in Table 2, which shows
three models corresponding with the three dependent variables.
The basic diagnostic checks hold for all models; the null hypotheses
of no second-order autocorrelation hold. Wald’s tests indicate that
the coefficients are jointly statistically significant in all models.
Thus, to proceed, the models can be briefly disseminated as follows:
(1) Three coefficients are statistically significant in the first
model. These are: GDP per capita, inward FDI flows, and the
transparency of governments’ policy-making processes. The
signs of the corresponding coefficients are also positive, as
was expected. Though, the magnitude of the coefficient for
the FDI variable is too small to warrant specific attention.
When people have more money, the demand for online me-
dia increases, and when a government is transparent, there
is more for journalists to report and readers to read.
(2) Two coefficients are statistically significant in the second
model: political arrests and governments’ removal of on-
line content. When recalling the operationalization (see Sec-
tion 3.3), the positive signs for the coefficients are also as
expected. When there is no fear of being arrested for re-
porting multiple viewpoints, the plurality of perspectives
expressed in online media increases. Analogous reasoning
applies when a government rarely removes online content.
(3) Three coefficients are statistically significant in the third
model. The first is the one for education quality, which has
a positive sign, which seems reasonable. The second one for
broadband subscriptions has a negative sign, however, which
seems illogical or at least unexpected. The third is again for
the coefficient of the content removal variable. Thus: when
removal of political content by a government is unlikely
due to legal protections, there are also less disagreements in
reporting major political events in online media.
These results align with prior expectations and seem sensible in
general, excluding the one negative sign noted. Although statistical
significance is hardly the only (or even the right) way to proceed
with statistical inference, what may seem a little surprising is the
lack of statistically significant effects for many of the variables.
For instance, the other coefficients for the infrastructure variables
are not statistically significant even at the conventional 𝑝 < 0.05
level. Alternative model specifications do not change the situation.
A potential explanation for the lack of statistically significant effects
for the infrastructure variables relates to the noted fact that the
infrastructure already exists in many countries. When considering
the second and third models, the perspectives and fractionalization,
it may also be that the infrastructures are already too good in some
countries with communist or authoritarian media systems. In other
words, the surveillance capabilities in many countries may well
establish a certain deterrence effect [29], leading to self-censorship
that may curtail press freedom and thus decrease the plurality of
political viewpoints by journalists in online media. Besides these
speculations, there is a potential statistical explanation.
It should be also recalled that the models estimated are dynamic
panel data models, and the magnitudes of the lagged dependent
variables indicate a high degree of persistence. A general lack of
longitudinal variance has been observed also previously with the
V-Dem data [32]. Furthermore, Wald’s 𝜒2-tests indicate that the
dummy variables for annual effects are not jointly statistically sig-
nificant in the second and third models. These points can be used to
argue that the situation has remainedmostly unchanged in the 2007–
2016 period observed. Nevertheless, to interpret the results against
the framework in Fig. 1, there is enough evidence to conclude that
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Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent variable (𝑦𝑖𝑡 )
Consumption Perspectives Fractionalization
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.578∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
Δ ln(GDP + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.119 −0.057 0.038
Δ ln(GDP + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.343∗∗ 0.102 −0.071
Δ(FDI)𝑖𝑡 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Δ(FDI)𝑖𝑡−1 0.002∗∗ < 0.001 < 0.001
Δ ln(Procurement + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.001 0.017 −0.023
Δ ln(Procurement + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.039 −0.005 −0.010
Δ(State economy)𝑖𝑡 −0.085 0.064 0.033
Δ(State economy)𝑖𝑡−1 0.069 0.140 −0.095
Δ ln(Electricity + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.096 −0.011 0.011
Δ ln(Electricity + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.047 −0.036 0.017
Δ ln(Education + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.001 0.098 0.024
Δ ln(Education + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.035 0.022 0.031∗∗
Δ ln(Broadband + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.018 0.009 0.003
Δ ln(Broadband + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.011 0.002 −0.032∗∗∗
Δ ln(Mobile + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.288 0.030 −0.024
Δ ln(Mobile + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.120 0.010 0.087
Δ ln(Rule of law + 1)𝑖𝑡 1.098 1.386 0.470
Δ ln(Rule of law + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.984 −1.045 0.329
Δ ln(Accountability + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.060 −0.021 −0.017
Δ ln(Accountability + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.051 0.101 −0.020
Δ ln(Transparency + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.530∗∗ 0.157 −0.437
Δ ln(Transparency + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.370 −0.153 0.273
Δ ln(Corruption + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.044 −0.168 0.078
Δ ln(Corruption + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.013 0.062 −0.139
Δ ln(Liberal democracy + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.102 −0.412 −0.739
Δ ln(Liberal democracy + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.446 0.007 −0.186
Δ ln(Freedom of expression + 1)𝑖𝑡 0.206 0.153 −0.058
Δ ln(Freedom of expression + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 −0.011 −0.753 0.344
Δ(Political arrests)𝑖𝑡 −0.002 0.377∗∗∗ 0.049
Δ(Political arrests)𝑖𝑡−1 0.002 0.017 −0.062
Δ ln(Content removal + 1)𝑖𝑡 −0.059 0.595∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
Δ ln(Content removal + 1)𝑖𝑡−1 0.158 −0.060 −0.227
H0: no AR(1), 𝑝-values < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
H0: no AR(2), 𝑝-values 0.334 0.564 0.765
economy, state administration, and politics (but not necessarily
infrastructure) contribute to the maturity of online media.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper examined the maturity of online media in time series
cross-sectional framework covering 134 countries in a period span-
ning ten years. Maturity was defined according to consumption of
online media, political perspectives expressed in online media, and
fractionalization of online media in terms of reporting major politi-
cal events. A simple four-dimensional analytical model (economics,
infrastructure, administration, and politics) was used to motivate
the empirical analysis. Based on dynamic panel data estimator, at
least one variable belonging to each dimension was statistically sig-
nificant in explaining the three concepts of maturity; namely, GDP
per capita, inward FDI flows, transparency of governmental admin-
istration, potential arrests due to political online content, content
removal by a government, education, and broadband subscriptions.
All in all, the results align with the prior theoretical speculations.
But, by design, the time series cross-sectional research setup can
only touch the surface of the question of online media maturity.
While sensible for the setup, particularly the independent variables
only indirectly proxy the underlying analytical dimensions in Fig. 1.
To gain a more realistic perspective, survey methodology would
be more suitable in order to gain explicit answers about the chal-
lenges and obstacles for building new digital media particularly
in developing countries. But then again, obtaining longitudinal
data with a global scope from surveys is an extremely difficult task
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without substantial resources. Given this backdrop, it seems sen-
sible to recommend that further work should be done to quantify
more variables in existing time series cross-sectional data frame-
works such as V-Dem. For instance, public service media has been
observed to be an important factor explaining the diversity of per-
spectives expressed in national media systems [13], and quantifying
the existence of public broadcasting should be a relatively easy task.
Public broadcasting and public service media in general are good
examples also from another perspective. Government intervention
has been argued to be necessary to bridge a digital divide in many
developing countries [24]. On one hand, this point can be taken
to reflect critically on the ideals of libertarian media systems in
English-speaking countries. It may be that economic opportunities
and civil liberties are not enough for a new online media system to
emerge; the corporatist model in the Nordic countries may be a vi-
able option. On the other hand, particularly in developing countries
the dangers of state control are real; having too much government
involvement may turn toward the communist and authoritarian
media system types via which the freedom of expression and other
civil liberties may be endangered. Every coin has two sides. Finally,
it is worth noting that a decade may be too short—after all, the
evolution of the printing press toward maturity took centuries.
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